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I. INTRODUCTION
In October 2001, President Bush gave the CIA explicit authorization to
carry out covert missions to assassinate Osama bin Laden and his supporters
around the world, which in effect has lifted the United States' twenty-
five-year ban on such activities.' "The US Defence Secretary, Donald
Rumsfeld, confirmed reports of such a move ... by telling CNN that the US
* J.D. candidate 2004, University of San Diego School of Law.
1. David Gow, Bush gives green light to CIA for assassination of named
terrorists, THE GUARDIAN UNLIMITED (Oct. 29, 2001), at http://www.guardian.co.uk (last
visited July 20, 2002).
would be acting in self-defense in carrying out such missions."2 The
purpose of this Comment is to explore the legal justification for the
targeted killing of a terrorist leader as an act of self-defense. In particular,
the focus of this Comment will be on the interpretation of the self-defense
doctrine under customary international law and the United Nations Charter.
3
First, this Comment will examine the background and common definitions
of assassination. Then, the focus will shift to an evaluation of the relevant
customary international law and the Caroline doctrine. Next, this Comment
will analyze the United Nations Charter, Article 5 14 as it relates to a
claim of self-defense in response to a terrorist attack. This Comment will
then turn to United States law and policy regarding assassination and explore
the issue of anticipatory self-defense through the use of assassination. Finally,
this Comment considers the following question: does an attacked state have
legal authority under international law to assassinate heads of state suspected
of terrorist acts or high-ranking officials of governments who harbor terrorists?
II. BACKGROUND AND DEFINITIONS OF ASSASSINATION
The word "assassination" originates from the order of the Assassins, an
eleventh and twelfth century Muslim sect that murdered high-ranking
officials in order to further their own political agendas.5 'The word is
derived from assassiyun, Arabic for fundamentalists, from the word
assass, foundation."6
One legal commentator has suggested that, in the law of armed conflict,
assassination is defined as the treacherous killing of a targeted individual.7
In fact, many of the. common definitions of assassination seem to
embody this language or language similar to it. According to Black's Law
Dictionary, Seventh Edition, assassination is defined as "[t]he act of
deliberately killing someone, [especially] a public figure, [usually] for
hire or political reasons. ' 8 Another definition holds that assassination occurs
when "those killings or murders, usually directed against individuals in
public life, [are] motivated by political rather than personal relationships." 9
2. Id.
3. U.N. CHARTER.
4. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
5. Daniel B. Pickard, Legalizing Assassination? Terrorism, the Central
Intelligence Agency, and International Law, 30 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 3 n.1 (2001).
6. Id. (citing LINDA LAUCELLA, ASSASSINATION: THE POLITICS OF MURDER at
ix. (1998).).
7. Id. at 21 n.61 (citing Michael N. Schmitt, State Sponsored Assassination in
International and Domestic Law, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 609 (1992)).
8. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 109 (7th ed. 1999).
9. W. Hays Parks, Memorandum of Law: Executive Order 12333 and Assassination,
1989 ARMY LAW. 4, 8 (citing HAVENS, LEIDEN, AND SCHMITr, ASSASSINATION AND
TERRORISM: THEIR MODERN DIMENSIONS 4 (1975)).
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According to legal scholar Daniel Pickard, within the context of
terrorism the term assassination signifies "the targeted killing by an
official agent of a nation of another individual, regardless of whether a
state of war exists."' 0  Generally, under customary international law,
assassination means "the selected killing of an [individual enemy] by
[treacherous means]."" The common thread thoughout these definitions
is the killing of a person for political reasons by treacherous means.
"'Treacherous means' include the procurement of another to act
treacherously and treachery itself is understood as a breach of [the] duty
of good faith toward the victim."'12 In times of war, it is generally prescribed
that a state's militia should act in good faith towards the enemy. 13 This
thought most likely means that the military should not execute or torture
opponents and should afford them due process of law.
14
Based on these definitions of assassination, if a state covertly killed a
known terrorist, would the killing actually be an assassination? At first
glance, the answer may appear to be yes if the terrorist is perceived to be
a public figure acting for political purposes. However, according to one
legal scholar, the term assassination is prone to overbroad application.' 5
"The meaning of the term 'assassination' in historical context, and in
light of its usage in the laws of war, is, simply, any unlawful killing of
particular individuals for political purposes.,' 6  However, under no
circumstances should assassination be defined to include any lawful
homicide. 17 Now in the instance of a known terrorist, a covert targeted
killing of the terrorist would not likely be considered an assassination
because, as discussed in detail below, there is a strong case for classifying the
killing as one in self-defense, which makes the killing a lawful act.
Further, "the targeting of terrorists focuses not on the public role of
the individual, but on the role played by them in the murder of innocent
civilians, and has as its goal not political motives but the saving of
10. Pickard, supra note 5, at 10.
11. Patricia Zengel, Assassination and the Law of Armed Conflict, 43 MERCER L.
REV. 615, 623 (1991).
12. Id. at 622.
13. See id.
14. James P. Rowles, Military Responses to Terrorism, Substantive and Procedural
Constraints in International Law, 81 Am. SOC'Y OF INT'L L. PROC. 287, 312 (1987).
15. Abraham D. Sofaer, The Sixth Annual Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in




life.' '18 One military law expert suggests that the employment of "clandestine,
low visibility or overt military force would not constitute assassination if
U.S. military forces were employed against the combatant forces of
another nation, a guerrilla force, or a terrorist or other organization
whose actions pose a threat to the security of the United States."' 9 This
suggestion makes sense because the objective of the killing is not to
murder but to protect the country's citizens from harm.
There has also been much historical debate about whether killing an
enemy during war by stealth is considered assassination or lawful
wartime killing. 20 Transnational assassination is normally considered a
war crime under international law when a condition of war exists
between states. 2 1 "According to Article 23(b) of the regulations annexed
to Hague Convention IV of October 18, 1907 ('Hague Regulations'),
respecting the laws and customs of war on land, '[I]t is especially
forbidden... [t]o kill or wound treacherously [to assassinate] individuals
belonging to the hostile nation or army."'
22
Although the United States has not officially declared war in over fifty
years,23 President George W. Bush has publicly announced a "war on
terrorism." Though this rhetoric sounds warlike, it is important to note
that the United States at present is not at war with any nation in the
constitutional sense.
Legal scholars focusing on the ways in which individuals could be
lawfully killed have chronicled assassination as a tactic of war.2 4
Specifically, these chroniclers of international law have denounced killing
by treacherous attack.25 Treacherous attack, under customary international
law, may be a breach of a duty of good faith toward the victim.
26
International law requires a state to observe the same protections of no
execution, no torture, and due process when dealing with terrorists
18. Press Release, Press Office, Embassy of Israel, (Nov. 1st, 2001), available at
http://www.israel-embassy.org.uk/web/pages/terrpres.htm.
19. Parks, supra note 9, at 8 (emphasis added).
20. See Zengel, supra note 11, at 618.
21. Louis Rend Beres, On Assassination as Anticipatory Self-Defense: The Case of
Israel, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 321, 327 (1991).
22. Id. (citing Convention (No. IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, with Annex of Regulations, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631) (third
alteration added).
23. Robert F. Turner, International Law and the Use of Force in Response to the
World Trade Center and Pentagon Attacks, THE JURIST (Oct. 8, 2001), available at
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/forumnew34.htm.
24. Zengel, supra note 11, at 617.
25. Id.
26. See generally Jami Melissa Jackson, The Legality of Assassination of Independent
Terrorist Leaders: An Examination of National and International Implications, 24 N.C.
J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 669 (1999).
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outside its borders.27 According to Alberto Coll, the covert assassination
of a terrorist by a hit squad violates international human rights law.
28
However, because the United States has not officially declared war, the
above analysis does not specifically apply to force used upon a terrorist.
29
As discussed below, if the United States is in fact entitled to use lethal
force against Osama bin Laden as a means of self-defense, then his
killing, even covertly, would not be illegal and thus not an assassination.
30
HI. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW OF SELF-DEFENSE
AND THE CAROLINE DOCTRINE
The fundamental doctrine of international law, the doctrine of
positivism, holds that "international law is the sum of the rules by which
states have consented to be bound, and that nothing can be law to which
they have not consented.",3' As such, under the doctrine of positivism,
unless there is an accepted prohibition against assassination of terrorists
under international law, states are permitted to engage in this behavior.
32
Generally, it is understood that Article 23b of the Hague Regulations,
1907, prohibits "assassination, proscription, or outlawry of an enemy, or
putting a price upon an enemy's head, as well as offering a reward for an
enemy 'dead or alive.' 33 Additionally:
The law of war does not allow proclaiming either an individual belonging to the
hostile army, or a citizen, or a subject of the hostile government, an outlaw, who
may be slain without trial by any captor, any more than the modern law of peace
allows such international outlawry; on the contrary, it abhors such outrage.
3 4
These principles are in great tension with modern theories of self-
protectionism. Many theorists believe that a country should have a legal
right to defend itself in the event of an attack and in the event of a
serious threatened attack. The question then is: to what extent can a state
protect its interests and its citizens when an attack occurs or when one is
imminent? One way of implementing self-protection is to assassinate, or
27. See Alberto R. Coil, The Legal and Moral Adequacy of Military Responses to
Terrorism, 81 AM. SOC'Y OFINT'L L. PROC. 287 (1987).
28. Id. at 305-06.
29. See Jackson, supra note 26, at 672.
30. Id. at 676.
31. See Pickard, supra note 5, at 10-11 (citation omitted).
32. Id. at 11.
33. U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL 27-10 para. 31, quoted in Sofaer, supra note 15, at 120.
34. U.S. ARMY GENERAL ORDER No. 100 para. 148, quoted in Sofaer, supra note
15, at 120.
maybe more accurately to "covertly kill," the offensive or threatening
target. This idea, as shocking to some as it may be, is the most effective
and least harmful alternative in the arsenal of self-defense. As explained
in detail below, assassination as a means of self-defense should be
permitted in some circumstances.
A famous international doctrine of self-defense is the standard prescribed
in the case of the Caroline.35 This international doctrine emerged from a
situation in 1837 involving a U.S. ship named the Caroline and the• 36
armed forces of Great Britain. The Caroline was used to send sympathetic
U.S. citizens to Canada to help those battling Great Britain's rule.3 7 The
British commander, Colonel Adam McNabb, ordered the destruction of
the Caroline, which was a privately owned steamship. 38 The British
claimed "that their use of force in U.S. territory was justified as lawful
self-preservation and self-defense., 39 The United States Secretary of
State, Daniel Webster, in a letter to Henry Fox, the British minister,
argued "that the use of self-defense should be confined to situations in
which a government can show the 'necessity of that self-defense is
instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment
for deliberation.' 40 "Together with a requirement of proportionality in
the use of force in self-defense, the sentence in question makes up what
has become known as the Caroline doctrine.'
Under the Caroline doctrine, a covert killing or assassination in self-
defense might be considered lawful under narrow circumstances where it
could be shown that the killing was necessary and proportional to the use
of force from the attacking party. But, in Nicaragua v. United States42
the International Court of Justice found that the United States' actions
did not meet the threshold for the necessity requirement. In that case,
Nicaragua charged the United States with being "in breach of its obligation
under general and customary international law [because it] has killed,
wounded and kidnapped and is killing, wounding and kidnapping
citizens of Nicaragua." 43 The United States alleged in a counter-memorial
filed with the court that it was acting proportionately and appropriately
35. Mark B. Baker, Terrorism and the Inherent Right of Self-Defense (A Call to
Amend Article 51 of the United Nations Charter), 10 Hous. J. INT'LL. 25, 32 (1987).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Robert F. Teplitz, Taking Assassination Attempts Seriously: Did the United
States Violate International Law in Forcefully Responding to the Iraqi Plot to Kill
George Bush?, 28 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 569, 576 (1995).
39. Timothy Kearley, Raising the Caroline, 17 WiS. INT'L L.J. 325, 325 (1999).
40. Id. at 325 (quoting 2 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
§ 217, at 409 (AMS Press 1970) (1906)).
41. Id. at 325.
42. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
43. Id. at 19.
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relying on the inherent right of self-defense guaranteed by Article 51 of
the United Nations Charter. 44 However, the court disagreed, holding that
"because certain American actions were taken 'several months after the
major offense of the armed opposition against the Government of El
Salvador had been completely repulsed,' the measures were unnecessary,
and it was possible to eliminate"45 the primary danger without the United
States instituting force in and against Nicaragua.46
Applying this strict interpretation of necessity under the Caroline
doctrine, would the covert killing of suspected terrorist Osama bin
Laden by the United States government be lawful? Using the Caroline
doctrine's standard of the necessity requirement would appear to yield
an answer in the negative. Like Nicaragua, several months have lapsed
since the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks and some may argue
that there is no need to repulse an attack. However, that analysis fails to
take into account the serious continued threat that bin Laden and his al
Qaeda network pose. Bin Laden is suspected of organizing the August
7, 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es
Salaam, Tanzania 47 in addition to the evidence indicating that he
masterminded the crimes of terror on September 11, 2001 on the World
Trade Center and U.S. Pentagon.48
Bin Laden has also called for Muslims to kill Americans all over the
world. 49 As such, that he presents a serious and continuing threat to the
safety of Americans everywhere is really not debatable. There is a
strong need for the United States to covertly target bin Laden because its
citizens will continue to be at high risk of another deadly attack.
Further, the situation involving Osama bin Laden is compelling and
overwhelming in the sense that there is little or no choice of means
available to avert further attacks against Americans other than to kill him
in self-defense. So long as Osama bin Laden is alive, there stands a
serious probability that he will commit further acts of terrorism upon
Americans through his agents, even from a prison cell.
44. Id. at 22.
45. Sofaer, supra note 15, at 97 (quoting Military and Paramilitary Activities
(Nicar. v. U.S.), supra note 42, at 122).
46. Id.
47. See Jackson, supra note 26, at 669.
48. Norman Kempster, Bin Laden Video May Show Guilt, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 10,
2001, at Al.
49. U.S. Indicts bin Laden in Bombings, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 5,
1998, at IA.
The case involving Osama bin Laden is also different from the facts of
the Nicaragua case because September 11, 2001 involved a direct, armed
attack. In Nicaragua, the court found that Nicaragua had been supplying
arms to the rebels in El Salvador for several years.50 The United States
claimed that it was acting in collective self-defense of El Salvador under
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.5' However:
The court concluded that a limited intervention of this sort cannot justify resort
to self-defense, because customary law only allows the use of force in self-
defense against an "armed attack," and an armed attack does not include
"assistance to rebels in the form of the provision of weapons or logistical or
other support.
52
Therefore, according to the International Court of Justice, it appears that
an armed attack against a state must be a direct attack. In the case of the
September 11, 2001 attacks, those attacks were direct and should qualify
as "armed attacks" against the United States.
The main problem here, if there is one, is the timeliness of the covert
killing of Osama bin Laden with respect to the necessity requirement
because several months have elapsed. But this has not occurred primarily
because he has not been found. Had the United States found him shortly
after the attacks, he more than likely would have been killed. It is not
the United States' failure to act in a timely manner; it is the failure of
their ability to act with precision in this situation. Therefore, there
should be some leeway on the timeliness of the response within the
necessity requirement where a terrorist attack has occurred. It is in the
interest of protecting the world's innocents as a whole that there should
be some flexibility built into the doctrine. Otherwise, the terrorist wins
by having the luxury of remaining hidden and forestalling the state's
right to come after him.
The second issue under the Caroline doctrine is that of proportionality.
The meaning of proportionality in the context of self-defense requires
that the force used in self-defense not be unreasonable or excessive.
53
"The use of force in self-defense must be proportionate to the terrorist
attacks to which it responds or anticipates. 54 On September 11, 2001,
the terrorist attacks on America claimed the lives of more than 3500 U.S.
citizens and foreign nationals by murder. According to the Los Angeles
Times, a videotape of Osama bin Laden documents his involvement in
50. Sofaer, supra note 15, at 93 (citing Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar.
v. U.S.), supra note 42 (Singh, J., separate opinion)).
51. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), supra note 42, at 22.
52. Sofaer, supra note 15, at 93-94 (citation omitted).
53. See Baker, supra note 35, at 32 (citation omitted).
54. Id. at 46-47.
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the September 11, 2001 attacks. The video shows bin Laden "[r]elaxed
and apparently enjoying himself, ... recount[ing]-in a conversation caught
on videotape-his satisfaction with the September 11 terrorist attacks,
pronouncing them a far greater success than he had dared to hope." 56 Of
the tape, "officials said it showed Bin Laden bragging about the damage
caused by the two hijacked jetliners flown into the twin towers of the
World Trade Center in New York. Bin Laden tells his listener that he
had hoped to topple the floors above the impact of the aircraft but that
the complete collapse of the buildings was a pleasant surprise. 5 7 As
there is strong independent and compelling evidence that Osama bin
Laden engineered these assaults on America, an operation by the United
States to assassinate him seems quite proportional when compared to the
murder of several thousand people on September 11, 2001.
However, one legal scholar, Liam Murphy, says of a terrorist act, it is
"by nature, an isolated act, a response of war is disproportionate and
therefore illegal. Likewise, a reprisal is an illegal response to 'private'
terrorist activity.' 8 He further opines that "private terrorists cannot be
attacked in the same way as a state because they have no territory or
government; their status as individuals changes the status of such an act
against them by a state from reprisal to, at least, execution. 59 Murphy
also believes that when a state suffers a terrorist attack, it has two
authorized options: (1) it can use guards as a means of force to defend
against the terrorist attack; and, (2) citizens of the state can resist such an
attack.60 "The proportionality of response is not at issue with respect to
the state's 'reaction' because the purpose of the reaction is to stop the
attack; the reaction period does not end until the attack is repelled."'"
However, this analysis hardly seems fair to the victimized state. A
state should have at its option the ability to protect its citizens against
further harm. Murphy basically compares a terrorist attack to that of a
street fight in which one who is attacked may only use the same or equal
amount of force to repel the attack. The problem though is that most often a
terrorist lies in wait and strikes without warning; further complicating
55. See Kempster, supra note 48.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Liam G.B. Murphy, A Proposal on International Legal Responses to Terrorism,





the picture, many terrorist groups have members willing to commit
suicide in the attack making it virtually impossible for the attacked
state to do anything to protect itself defensively. The better alternative
would be to allow a state under attack to respond in self-defense
directly to the threat so long as it is necessary to avert further attacks
and the response is proportional. An attacked state should not have to
lie down and do nothing in response to a terrorist attack. This
alternative not only allows the state to protect its citizens from harm
but also economizes the total harm.
IV. ASSASSINATION AS SELF-DEFENSE: UNITED NATIONS
CHARTER ARTICLES 2 AND 5162
"[T]he United Nations Charter has been established as the dominant
international legal paradigm concerning the 'use of force."' 63 Article
103 of the Charter explicitly states that the Charter supercedes all other
international obligations of its Members. 64 The article states: "[i]n the
event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the
United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under
any other international agreement, their obligations under the present
Charter shall prevail. 65
Under Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter, there exists a prohibition
of the use of force.66 Article 2, paragraph 4 specifically states that "[a]ll
Member states shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations. 67 The main goal of the Charter is prevention of war.68
However, although the Charter prohibits the use of armed force, it does
recognize exceptions.
The U.N. Charter contains four explicit exceptions to the Article 2 (4)
prohibition on the use of force, namely force that is: (1) used in self-defense; (2)
authorized by the Security Council; (3) undertaken by the five major powers
before the Security Council is functional; and (4) undertaken against the enemy
states of the Second World War.
69
The focus here will be on force used in self-defense. Article 51 of the
United Nations Charter states:
62. U.N. CHARTER arts. 2, 51.
63. See Pickard, supra note 5, at 11.
64. Id. at 11; U.N. CHARTER art. 103.
65. U.N. CHARTER art. 103.
66. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
67. Id.
68. See generally Symposium, 81 AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L L. PROC. 287 (1987).
69. Pickard, supra note 5, at 12 (citation omitted).
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Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of
this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and
shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council
under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in
order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
70
"This self-defense exception is widely accepted as a rule of customary
international law. ' 71 This interpretation of Article 51 mirrors the Caroline
doctrine to some extent with its requirements of necessity and proportionality.
Invocation of Article 51 is not without historical precedent. 72 "The
Israelis used it in defense of its raid on Entebbe as did the United
States in attempting to justify its bombing of Libya." 73 The United
States also invoked the doctrine in the Nicaragua case 74 and in
response to the attacks on September 11, 2001. Like the Caroline
doctrine, under Article 51, any use of force in self-defense is "subject
to the requirements of necessity and proportionality.,
76
For the use of force in self-defense to be permissible under the Charter, such
force must.. .be immediately subsequent to and proportional to the armed attack
to which it was an answer. If excessively delayed or excessively severe, it
ceased to be self-defense and became a reprisal which was an action inconsistent
with the purposes of the United Nations.
77
Although any response by a Member of the United Nations that has
been attacked should be close to the actual time of the attack,
the timing of a response to an attack upon a state should not be judged by the
same standard used to [assess] a claim of self-defense by an individual who is
attacked. An individual's response is normally spontaneous, whereas a state
requires a more calculated response when its "collective life is threatened.
78
70. See U.N. CHARTER art. 51 (emphasis added).
71. Pickard, supra note 5, at 18.
72. See Baker, supra note 35.
73. Id. at 29 (citations omitted).
74. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), supra note 42, at 22.
75. Letter dated 7 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the United
States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security
Council, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/2001/946 [hereinafter Letter].
76. Oscar Schachter, The Lawful Resort to Unilateral Use of Force, 10 YALE J.
INT'L L. 291, 292 (1985).
77. Baker, supra note 35, at 34 (quoting U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 20th Sess.,
886th mtg. at para. 42, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/886 (1965) (assertion of Mexican delegate)).
78. Id.
However, some critics argue that the stricter interpretation of the
Caroline doctrine should apply in the analysis of Article 51's self-
defense provision.79 In fact, both liberal and conservative critics agree
that states justifying military responses under the pretext of Article 5 I's
self-defense provision,
should be interpreted in the light of customary international law and of the
classic words of U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster to the effect that self-
defense applies only in extraordinary circumstances where "the necessity of that
self-defense is instant, over-whelming, leaving no choice of means, and no
moment for deliberation."
80
Under that analysis, 'these critics argue that responding to a terrorist
attack does not meet the standard set out in the Caroline doctrine,
because the response would be retaliatory or considered an act of
reprisal. But this analysis wholly ignores the interest a state has in
protecting its citizens from harm. A state may not know immediately
who its attacker is. Time to investigate is reasonable under circumstances
such as a terrorist attack because the state has a strong interest in
preventing the same or similar attacks in the immediate future.
The best view is to give the state time to act. A state arguably needs
some time to investigate who committed the attack against it, as well as
how it was attacked and why. This is needed because it is not always
apparent at the outset with any degree of certainty who has committed a
particular terrorist attack, and to prohibit a state from defending itself
because of this initial uncertainty would be grossly unfair.
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter also requires that invocation
of self-defense applies only "if an armed attack occurs against a Member
of the United Nations.' 8' What is meant by "armed attack" under the
Charter? Does it require one sovereign to physically attack another? Or
would an attack by a terrorist organization qualify as an armed attack?
Surely at the time the Charter was written, terrorist attacks were not at
the forefront of the minds of the drafters; or, maybe the drafters found
the words to be sufficiently clear.82 Even so, a common sense reading
should include any physical attack upon a state's territory.
According to one legal scholar, "it does not seem unreasonable... to allow
a state victim of an attack to retaliate with force beyond the immediate
area of attack when that state has good reason to expect a continuation of
attacks from the same source."83 This is because the primary motive
79. E.g., Coil, supra note 27, at 301.
80. Id.
81. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
82. See Baker, supra note 35, at 33.
83. Schachter, supra note 76, at 293.
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behind the use of force would be protection, not retaliation.14 Additionally,
when several acts of terrorism against a state are taken together,
collectively the attacks could be viewed as an "armed attack" under the
Charter because the past injuries and risk of future attacks rise to an
intolerable level which threatens world peace. 85 "The extent of terrorist
activity [may be] relevant in assessing the plea of self-defense."
86
Obviously, one should treat an isolated terrorist act differently from an
act of terrorism, which is just one link in a long chain of terrorist acts,
particularly when it is obvious that so many such acts could not have
been carried out without the encouragement, knowledge or acquiescence
of another state. Each of the acts of terrorism, when viewed separately, might
not qualify as an "armed attack," but the totality of such acts may reveal
such a pattern. This phenomenon is called Nadelstichtaktik ("tactics of the
needle prick"), a phrase coined by German international lawyers.87 "This
approach holds that while each needle prick in itself may not amount to a
serious and intolerable injury to the victim, the overall effect of many
needle pricks may be serious and intolerable." 88 Further, "[o]ne commentator
has suggested that the purpose of the prerequisite in Article 51 of an
armed attack 'limits the use of force to situations involving the type of
serious attack on a state that can be verified by independent observers.'
8 9
Given this interpretation of "armed attack" under Article 51 of the Charter,
the continuous and systematic assaults on Americans around the world by
Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda network is an armed attack against America.
In fact, the United States has come to this conclusion. In a Letter dated
October 7, 2001 from the United States of America to the United Nations
addressed to the President of the Security Council, John Negroponte stated:
In accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, I wish, on
behalf of my Government, to report that the United States of America, together
with other States, has initiated actions in the exercise of its inherent right of
individual and collective self-defence following the armed attacks that were
carried out against the United States on 11 September 2001.90
84. Id.
85. See Baker, supra note 35, at 42.
86. Id. (quoting Yahuda Z. Blum, The Beirut Raid and the International Double
Standard: A Reply to Professor Richard A. Falk, 64 AM J. INT'L L. 80, 136 (1970)).
(The source of this quotation is uncertain because Blum's article as published starts on
page 73 and concludes on page 105. Ed.)
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See Jackson, supra note 26, at 681 n.82 (quoting Rowles, supra note 14, at 310).
90. See Letter, supra note 75.
Even in a situation where an armed attack has not yet occurred, some
prominent legal scholars believe a state is justified under Article 51
when it uses force preemptively. 91 According to Judge Sofaer:
[A] sound construction of Article 51 would allow any State, once a terrorist
,attack occurs' or is about to occur, to use force against those responsible for the
attack in order to prevent the attack or to deter further attacks unless reasonable
ground exists to believe that no further attack will be undertaken.
92
Use of force should include the covert killing of the terrorist because it is
the most efficient means of averting future harm. By covertly targeting
a known terrorist, additional lives can be saved, as compared to bombing
campaigns. Furthermore, the costs of tracking and extraditing a known
terrorist are not only monetary, but also fruitless because of the
likelihood that the terrorist will continue his attacks through agents while
he or she is held captive.
V. U.S. LAW ON ASSASSINATION: EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,333
United States Presidential Executive Order 12,333 promulgates that
"[n]o person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States
government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination .... no
agency of the Intelligence Community shall participate in or request any
person to undertake activities forbidden by this Order." 93 The purpose of
Executive Order 12,333 and its predecessors was to "preclude unilateral
actions by individual agents or agencies against selected foreign public
officials and to establish beyond any doubt that the United States does
not condone assassination as an instrument of national policy."
94
However, assassination is not defined in the Order. The Order was
promulgated directly after a controversy arose regarding the alleged role
of the CIA in the planned killing of certain heads of state and other
foreign high-ranking officials.95  Both houses of Congress conducted
investigations into the conduct of the CIA.96  "The Senate Select
Committee found that Agency officials might have undertaken these
plots without express authorization from the President and that some
Agency officials were operating under the assumption that such actions
were permissible." 97 The Committee found that "[flour of [the instances]
91. Sofaer, supra note 15, at 95.
92. Id.
93. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59941, 59952 (Dec. 4, 1981), available
at WL 760054 (Pres.).
94. See Parks, supra note 9, at 8.
95. See Sofaer, supra note 15, at 118.
96. Id. See also U.S. Intelligence Agencies and Activities: Hearing Before the
House Select Comm. On Intelligence, 94th Cong., I st & 2nd Sess. 1-6 (1975-76).
97. See Sofaer, supra note 15, at 118-19.
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involved plots to overthrow governments dominated by the leaders
targeted for assassination, [a] fifth was an attempt to prevent a new
government from assuming power." 98 "One case investigated by the Church
Committee was that of GeneralRenee Schneider of Chile, who died of
injuries sustained during a kidnapping attempt in 1970." 99 The Committee
also found "that the CIA had been actively involved in efforts to prevent
Salvadore Allende from taking office as Chile's president, and that
General Schneider was thought to be an obstacle to that goal."' 00 The
Committee concluded that outside of the context of war, assassination
should be rejected as a tool of foreign policy.'0 ' The main reason for the
Committee's finding was the idea "that assassination is 'incompatible
with American principles, international order, and morality."",
10 2
The Committee also recommended legislation making assassination a
criminal offense for those falling within the jurisdiction of the U.S.
courts. 10 3 However, a statute was never enacted.' °4 Some scholars suggest
that because Congress did not enact legislation forbidding assassination,
there might be room for implicit authority for the President to retain it as
a policy option. 0 5 Additionally, the main focus of the congressional
investigations demonstrates a concern on the part of the Congress that
political leaders not be targeted by assassination. 0 6  However, the
investigations do not appear to have contemplated the 'covert and
targeted killing of a terrorist.
10 7
In October 2001, President George W. Bush gave the CIA explicit
authorization to carry out covert missions to assassinate Osama bin
Laden and his supporters around the world, which in effect has lifted the
United States' 25-year ban on such activities. 108 This is not the first
attempt by the United States government to find a way to lawfully
assassinate Osama bin Laden. In a Congressional Review of Covert
Operations in September 1998, the Senate Judiciary Committee requested
FBI Director Freeh to conduct research on the legality of assassination
98. See Pickard, supra note 5, at 23 (citations omitted).
99. Id.
100. Zengel, supra note 11, at 632.
101. Id. at 142. See also U.S. Intelligence Agencies and Activities, supra note 96.
102. Id. (quoting U.S. Intelligence Agencies and Activities, supra note 96, at 1).
103. Id. at 144.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See Pickard, supra note 5, at 25.
107. Id.
108. See Gow, supra note 1.
of terrorist leaders (this request coming after the August 7, 1998 U.S.
Embassy Bombings in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania).109
Coincidently, in 1998,
[w]ith regard to Osama bin Laden, ... after the bombing of the U.S. embassies
in Africa, President Bill Clinton issued a 'presidential finding' authorizing the
CIA to initiate covert operations overseas to foil and, where possible, prevent
terrorism by bin Laden's al Qaeda network. The finding seems not to have been
converted into a Presidential Decision Directive, as these are numbered and
identified sequentially for 1998 (it is possible, however, that a portion of a PDD
in the 1998 series remains classified.) President George W. Bush reportedly
extended this authorization when he assumed office, but again there is no
indication of which, if any National Security Presidential Directive is involved.1 10
Furthermore, evidence that the U.S. ban on assassinations should be
interpreted with limited scope appears from the United States' continued
"use of military force to capture or kill individuals whose peacetime actions
constitute a direct threat to U.S. citizens or U.S. national security.""'
"Because the United States recognizes the use of self-defense against
continuing threats, the right of self-defense would justify attacks against
terrorist leaders who represent a continuing threat to the safety of U.S.
citizens and/or U.S. national security." ' 12 It was also the understanding of the
Clinton administration that if the United States were harmed or threatened
with violence from an organization, the government would be authorized
to use the military against the leaders of that organization. 13 The types
of killings that were so heavily criticized at the time Executive Order
12,333 was adopted were not "lawful killings undertaken in self defense
against terrorists who attack Americans or against their sponsors." 1 4 The
United States has a long history of justifying the use of force as a viable
mode of self-defense where illegal use of force is made against it."'
Moreover, because the last four Presidents have made it clear that
executive officials are not to murder any person for political reasons, there
is no need to interpret the assassination prohibition in a way that inhibits
the "lawful" exercise of lethal force, as in the context of self-defense."H
6
109. See Jackson, supra note 26, at 669.
110. Col. Daniel Smith, Presidential Orders and Documents Regarding Foreign
Intelligence and Terrorism, at http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/presidential-orders.cfm (last
modified June 17, 2002).
Il1. Parks, supra note 9, at 7 (arguing for the existence of adequate historical precedent
for the use of military force in peacetime operations).
112. See Jackson, supra note 26, at 675.
113. Paul Richter, White House Justifies Option of Lethal Force, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
29, 1998, at Al.
114. Sofaer, supra note 15, at 119.
115. Id.at93.
116. Id. at 123.
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VI. ANTICIPATORY SELF-DEFENSE
At what point does a threat to a country's national security and defense
signal a justification for a targeted killing? According to Professor Beres of
Purdue University, a serious threat exists with respect to small battlefield
type nuclear weapons."i7 Beres says:
Because these weapons are more amenable to clandestine removal, and because
custodians of these weapons are generally in economic distress, there is
considerable risk of black market sales to terrorist groups. This risk could
intensify to the point that Islamic militants might identify sympathetic custodial
authorities in such successor states, especially Kazakhstan.
118
With respect to Iraq, Saddam Hussein has been building an arsenal of
weapons of mass destruction." 9 At what point does the United States or
any other state threatened have justification under international law to
use force to eliminate that threat? Any attempt to address this inquiry
should begin with an analysis of the requirements of self-defense under
international law, to determine whether the response would be anticipatory
or reactionary. If analyzed under United Nations Charter, Article 51,
three elements would have to be positively met. First, the use of force,
or in this case the targeted killing of Saddam Hussein, would need to be
necessary. If by necessary, we mean that it Would be necessary to
prevent a planned attack by Hussein, then it would seem that a state
would be justified at least with respect to the necessity element. If a
state had enough credible intelligence to convince the United Nations of
a serious, real, and credible threat that the state would soon be attacked,
it would seem plausible that the necessity element could be met.
The next issue is whether the anticipatory assassination of a terrorist
would be considered proportional, to the threat of an attack. It would be
proportional if there were a high degree of probability that one or more
persons would be killed in the terrorist attack. Further, if "the perceived
alternative to assassination as anticipatory self-defense is large-scale
uses of force-activities taking the form of defensive military strikes-a
utilitarian or balance-of-harms criterion could surely favor assassination."'
120
It makes sense to try to minimize the collateral damage as much as
117. Louis Rend Beres, On International Law and Nuclear Terrorism, 24 GA. J.
INT'L &CoMp. L. 1, 13 (1994).
118. Id.
119. See BBC News, Blair and Bush 'to discuss Iraq action', (Feb. 24, 2002), at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi//world/middleeast/1 838294.stm.
120. Beres, supra note 117, at 33.
possible in an attempt to protect the state. Further, one legal scholar
believes that "a nation has the right to resist the injury another seeks to
inflict upon it, and to use force and every other just means of resistance
against the aggressor."'' 21 Professor Beres warns however that a state
must be careful to avoid acting upon vague or doubtful suspicions or else
the state may run the risk of becoming the aggressor in the process. 22
Though it seems plausible for the elements of necessity and
proportionality to be met in the anticipatory self-defense arena, under
Article 5 1, there remains the problem of the required "armed attack."'
' 23
The specific language in Article 51 suggests that self-defense can only
be claimed, in the instance of defense,
against an "armed attack" that "occurs ... against [the territory of] a Member."
Proponents of this restrictive view of self defense would greatly limit the extent
to which force could lawfully be used to prevent or to deter future attacks and to
defend against attacks upon the citizens or property of a member, outside its
territory, that cannot be said to threaten its "territorial integrity or political
independence." 124
This view presents somewhat of a problem if a state is attacked
abroad, such as in the 1998 embassy bombings; 25 or, when a state is in
anticipation of an armed attack that will no doubt eventually happen
though the exact timing of such attack may be unknown. Another issue
of great concern is the threat of nuclear attack. 126 Under this restrictive
view, a state would need to face the possibility of total annihilation
before it would be justified in its response of force.
2 7
1 However, there are legal scholars that do support "the view that attacks
on a State's citizens in foreign countries can sometimes be regarded as
armed attacks under the Charter."' 128  The United States has always
interpreted the phrase "armed attack" "in a reasonable manner, consistent
with a customary practice that enables any State effectively to protect
itself and its citizens from every illegal use of force aimed at the State."'
' 29
A solution to this problem would be to liberally interpret the term
"armed attack," or to remove it altogether from the language of the
Charter. Of course, states should not be able to just go around killing
targets that they claim threaten the security and safety of their territorial
121. Id. at31.
122. Id. at 32.
123. See U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
124. Sofaer, supra note 15, at 93.
125. See generally Jackson, supra note 26.
126. Id. at 682.
127. Id.
128. Sofaer, supra note 15, at 94 (citing Oscar Schachter, The Extra-Territorial Use
of Force Against Terrorist Bases, 11 Hous. J. INT'L L. 309, 312 (1989)).
129. Id. at 94.
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sovereignty; but, if sufficient, proper, and reasonable intelligence evidence
is available, a state should legally have the right to protect itself from
impending harm. The main problem with this approach however is the
standard by which the intelligence evidence would be judged. Generally,
evidence that is independently verifiable by the United Nations should
pass muster. The United Nations would need to employ the means and
expertise to accomplish this goal. In the alternative, a threatened United
Nations member may be able to use other means through the treaty to
use force to thwart an attack. A state could obtain authorization from the
Security Council. 30 In the end, it is likely that most states would feel
more secure in knowing that self-defense was at their disposal and under
what circumstances it could be employed.
VII. ASSASSINATION OF HEADS OF STATE SUSPECTED OF TERRORIST
ACTS AND HIGH-RANKING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
WHO HARBOR TERRORISTS
Heads of state have traditionally been legally protected against
assassination in times of war and peace.' 31 "The historical justification
for preventing assassinations was based on 'the premise that making war
was a proper activity of sovereigns for which they ought not be required
to sacrifice their personal safety."" 32 However, what if a leader of a
state presents or sponsors a threat of terrorism upon another state?
Should the state threatened be permitted under international law to
anticipatorily strike or assassinate, in an effort to defend itself from an
attack? As stated above, if independently verifiable intelligence were
available to confirm the planned attack, it would seem quite unfair to
force a state to endure a devastating attack before it could act with force
to defend itself. 33 We live in a world of dangerous weaponry that is
becoming increasingly easy to obtain by rouge nations.'34 The threat of
nuclear attack or attacks with other weapons of mass destruction is a
reality in our present day lives.
Such a situation exists today with respect to Iraqi leader Saddam
Hussein, who has been reported to be stockpiling weapons of mass
130. See Pickard, supra note 5, at 12.
131. Cf. Sofaer, supra note 15, at 120 (citing Article 23(b) of the 1907 Hague
Regulations and U.S. Army Field Manual 27-10).
132. See Jackson, supra note 27, at 685 (quoting Zengel, supra note 11, at 621).
133. See id. at 682.
134. See generally Beres, supra note 117.
destruction. 135 "In light of the potential for devastating terrorist attacks
involving [weapons of mass destruction], the right of self-defense has
been argued to include the option of assassination." 36 Furthermore,
international protocol holds that the lawful use of defensive force,
including assassination, should be allowed when necessary and where
the magnitude is proportional "to the task at hand."'
137
With respect to high-ranking officials of governments who harbor
terrorists, under the United Nations Charter, "[i]f the evidence shows
that any country intentionally aided or abetted the terrorists, the United
States and its allies may use necessary and proportional lethal force
against those states to bring an end to such aid."'' 38 Further, the U.S.
Department of State avers that the United States has long assumed that
the inherent right of self-defense potentially applies against any illegal
use of force, and that it extends to any group or State that can properly
be regarded as responsible for such activities. 39
VIII. CONCLUSION
In the evaluation of the legality of assassination of a terrorist leader
under international law, it is important to remember that international
law is the set of rules that the nations collectively agree to be bound
by.' 40 This is the doctrine of positivism. If most of the world's nations,
or at a minimum those counties who are members of the United Nations,
collectively agree that United Nations Charter, Article 51 is the international
authority for a claim of self-defense in response to terrorist attacks and
threats, then the analysis depends upon necessity, proportionality, and
whether there was an armed attack. Under Article 51 of the United
Nations Charter, self-defense may validly be claimed if a state suffers an
armed attack and the response to the attack is timely (necessary) and
proportionate to the original armed attack. "There is a global consensus
that nations that suffer a terrorist attack are entitled to defend themselves
in a timely and proportionate manner."' 4 1 Professor Beres agrees that
"[a]lthough the idea of assassination as a remedy is normally dismissed
as an oxymoron under international law, [because arguably the term by
definition makes it illegal], there are circumstances wherein it would be
decidedly rational and humane."'
' 42
135. See Blair and Bush, supra note 119.
136. See Pickard, supra note 5, at 20.
137. See Zengel, supra note 11, at 638.
138. See Turner, supra note 23.
139. See generally Symposium, supra note 68.
140. See Pickard, supra note 5, at 10-1I.
141. Id. at 21 (citation omitted).
142. Beres, supra note 117, at 33.
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Legal scholars appear to agree on at least four items with respect to
terrorist attacks:
(1) if it has suffered an armed attack by terrorist actors, a state is entitled to defend
itself forcibly; (2) a victim state's forcible self-defense measures should be timely;
(3) a victim state's forcible self-defense measures should be proportionate; and (4)
a victim state's forcible self-defense measures should be discriminate and taken
against targets responsible in some way for the armed attack. 143
Times have changed in the last quarter century and the interpretation of
the principles behind the customary international law of self-defense
needs to be interpreted to recognize this change. Today the world
faces terrorists that are not afraid to commit suicide in the name of
harming others to make a political statement. The old restrictions that
customary international law and Article 51 place on a state's ability to
protect its citizens are devastating road blocks to security and peace. A
state needs to be able to seek out the perpetrators of terrorism and
eliminate the threat they pose not only to the state's sovereignty but
also to the world at large.
Terrorists are like pirates and should have minimal protection
under international law (for example, they should not be tortured).
144
Osama bin Laden is already a "lawful target because of his past acts
of terrorism and his public threats to attack Americans at every
opportunity .... [L]ethal force against bin Laden as a measure of
self-defense would not be 'murder,' and [therefore] ... could not be
[considered an] 'assassination.' ' 45 To date, the United Nations has
not disapproved of the United States' actions in response to the
September 11, 2001 attacks on America. It also appears unlikely that
the United Nations would object to the targeted killing of Osama bin
Laden by the United States as an act of self-defense.
With regard to the anticipatory use of force against Saddam Hussein in
response to the threat he poses, the water is a bit murky. It is not clear
that the United States could justify his assassination under current
international law because of the required "armed attack" provision of
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.1 46  However, one possible
resolution to this problem is for the United Nations to construct a
143. Robert J. Beck & Anthony Clark Arend, "Don't Tread on Us": International
Law and Forcible State Responses to Terrorism, 12 Wis. INT'L L. J. 153, 213 (1993).
144. See Turner, supra note 23.
145. Id.
146. See U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
provision providing for a standard of proof for individuals and countries
suspected of an anticipated attack. This would guard against abuses of
the self-defense doctrine while at the same time give the threatened state
the ability to adequately protect itself and its citizens from harm.
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